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Martin L. Friedland*
This year is not only the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Law Faculty at 
the University of New Brunswick, but it is also the 100th anniversary of the 
enactment of the Canadian Criminal Code. The Criminal Code received Royal 
Assent on 9 July 1892 and came into force on 1 July 1893.1 This paper concerns 
some of the developments in Canadian criminal justice over the past one hundred 
years.
When the 1892 Code was enacted, R.B. Bennett was just about to enter his 
final year at Dalhousie Law School, having stood first in the “crimes” course in 
first year. He then practised law in Chatham, New Brunswick before moving out 
West. A recent biographer2notes that R.B. Bennett first made his legal reputation 
in Calgary at the end of the century with a spectacular jury acquittal in an 
attempted murder case. The accused was a husband who unquestionably shot his 
wife’s alleged lover. The defence, which the jury accepted, appeared to be the 
well-known one that the victim “got what he deserved.” R.B. Bennett was 
obviously a very effective criminal lawyer, and so this is another reason why it is 
fitting to devote this Viscount Bennett lecture to criminal justice. I should point 
out, however, that this case was apparently the only one involving murder or 
attempted murder in which Bennett ever appeared.
The 1892 Code was the product of the efforts of four Maritimers. It was 
initiated by Sir John Thompson, “The Man From Halifax,” as Peter Waite entitled 
his biography of the then federal Minister of Justice and future Prime Minister.3 
The drafting was done by a New Brunswicker, George Burbridge,4 the Deputy 
Minister of Justice in Ottawa, and by his successor as Deputy Minister, a Nova 
Scotian, Robert Sedgwick.5 They were assisted by a federal civil servant, Charles 
Harding Masters.6 It is to the unknown and unsung Charles Harding Masters,
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another New Brunswicker, who no doubt did most of the work on the 1892 Code, 
that I would dedicate this lecture, if a dedication were considered appropriate.
If Charles Harding Masters returned today to a criminal court in New 
Brunswick or Ontario, what changes would he note? He might be inclined to say 
that things have not changed significantly in the area of criminal justice in the past 
100 years.
We are still using essentially the same Criminal Code that he helped draft a 
century ago, although he would wonder why the present version has the names 
Martin and Greenspan stamped on the front. Moreover, the courtroom and the 
courthouse would look about the same, and often it is the very same courtroom 
that was in use 100 years ago; the accused would, in some cases, be held pending 
trial in a county jail that predated Confederation; and the sentence might be 
served in one of the institutions that were in use a century ago, such as Kingston 
Penitentiary in Ontario or Dorchester Penitentiary in New Brunswick.
However, his guide would explain that things are not as they seem. 
Dorchester Penitentiary, for example, is at this very moment being renovated so 
that in 1993 it will provide psychiatric care for severely disordered offenders 
throughout the Atlantic region.7 Moreover, he would be told, the 1892 Code has 
been frequently amended and was thoroughly revised in 1955.8 Masters would 
nevertheless conclude, as he thumbed through the present Code, that it still bore 
the basic character of James Fitzjames Stephen’s draft code of 1878,9 and the 
Royal Commissioners’ Code of 187910 (primarily the work of Stephen), which 
formed the basis of the 1892 Code.
Masters knew that Canada had a choice between Stephen’s right wing, 
moralistic, anti-labour, authoritarian code and the left wing, pro-labour, liberal one 
drafted for the Colonial Office in the 1870s by Mr. Justice R.S. Wright, as he later 
became. I documented the story of these two competing codes in an article I 
wrote a number of years ago.11 Comparing these two models gave me the 
obvious insight that codes reflect the philosophy of their drafters. The Criminal 
Code we adopted was not inevitable. We had a choice. Therefore, it tells us
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something about Canadian society in the 1890s that Stephen’s right wing code was 
the one selected as the foundation of our own Criminal Code. Stephen’s code was 
not even enacted in England, in part because of its authoritarian nature. We will 
return to the question of codification later.
The adversary system, Masters would note, is still the dominant mode of 
searching for the truth; the rules of evidence are still reasonably familiar; and the 
experts still give evidence in much the same way as they did a century ago. The 
subject of the expert testimony, however, differs. For example, there was no 
fingerprint or D.NA. or radar or breathalyser evidence then, and there were no 
automobiles.
However, psychiatric evidence and the test for insanity today and would have 
a very familiar ring to them.12 It is unlikely that Mr. Masters or anyone else a 
century ago spotted the fact that the insanity defence in the 1892 Code mistakenly 
used the word “and” rather than “or” in the test of insanity.13 This made it more 
difficult for an accused to prove insanity because both heads of the M’Naghten test 
would have to be satisfied, not just one of the heads. The accused would have to 
show that he did not know the nature and quality of his act and that he did not 
know it was wrong. The “and” continued until 1931 when the Ontario Court of 
Appeal pointed out that it was clearly a drafting error.14 How many people were 
wrongly hanged between 1892 and 1931 because of this drafting error we will 
never know.
Looking around the courtroom, Masters would think that crime by youth was 
no longer a problem in Canada, until he was told that an Act had been passed in 
1908 to set up a separate court system for juvenile delinquents.15 He would 
correctly note that a separate system of military justice still exists for all but the 
most serious offences. He would be told that military justice survived a Bill of 
Rights attack in 198016 and, although the system was wounded in very recent
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Charter of Rights11 cases, those within the military system were able to regroup, 
have new legislation enacted, and survive.18
Masters would certainly not be surprised to see accused persons entering the 
witness box in their own defence. The 1892 Code brought about this major 
change. However, even before that, an accused could usually give an unsworn 
statement from the prisoner’s dock.19
Nor would he be surprised at the sentences imposed by the courts, although 
he would be puzzled by the number of cases in which both the Crown and the 
defence seemed to agree upon a sentence for a lesser included offence. The 
practice would be described as “plea negotiation” by those who approved of the 
practice and as “plea bargaining” by those who did not. Apart from capital and 
corporal punishment, which no longer exist, the sentences imposed today are not 
too different than they were in his day. He would not be aware that since his day 
we have seen the rise and fall of the rehabilitative ideal.20 Canada, however, did 
not go overboard as did the United States with indeterminate sentencing. The 
American reaction to the rehabilitative ideal of adopting fixed, rigid sentencing, 
with little discretion and the elimination of parole, never gained as powerful a 
foothold in Canada.21 Canadians still rely for the most part on the discretion of 
the trial judge, with guidance from Courts of Appeal. Parole has not been and is 
not likely to be abolished in Canada.
He would be surprised about the so-called “golden thread” of the 
Woolmington case.22 In 1892, the onus of proving defences that related to the 
accused’s mental state — for example, accident and drunkenness — was on the 
accused. In 1935, the House of Lords changed the law and held that the onus of 
disproving these defences was on the Crown, subject to statutory exceptions. The 
presumption of innocence has now been constitutionalized in Canada under 
section 11(d) of the Charter and most of the reverse onus provisions in the 
Criminal Code have been eliminated.
17Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of 
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Masters would note that the lawyers he saw in the criminal courts still 
practised either alone or with one or two other lawyers, as virtually all lawyers did 
in his day. He would perhaps not realize that while this still tends to be the 
pattern for criminal lawyers, there are now law firms in Canada with four or five 
hundred lawyers.
No doubt he would be surprised at the number of women in the legal 
profession. For the past few years, half of the incoming class at the University of 
Toronto Law School, and I believe at most other Canadian law schools, is female. 
In 1892, there were no female lawyers, judges or jurors in Canada. In the turn-of- 
the-century New York murder case about which I have just finished writing, 
women were even excluded from hearing the jury’s verdict in a murder case 
because it was feared they might make an emotional scene.
Unfortunately, there were as many female victims in the 19th century as there 
are today. In my study of the Lipski case in London, England in 1887,1 noted that 
the victims of all the murder cases in London in the three years previous to the 
Lipski case were women.23 Today, as in 1892, there are still far more female 
homicide victims than there are female homicide offenders.24 A recent study in 
Ontario showed that from 1974-1990 in Ontario, 417 women were killed by their 
spouses, compared with 141 men.25 Homicide in such cases is often the end 
result of a series of violent incidents. Thus, homicide is some measure of the 
extent of violence against women. In 1892, spousal violence cases were probably 
rarely prosecuted, while today charges are frequently brought. The result is a 
large increase in the prosecution of family violence cases.
What Mr. Masters would not grasp by his appearance in court is what is taking 
place outside the courtroom. There has been a major increase in the number of 
criminal charges, in the proliferation of correctional institutions, and in the growth 
of police forces.
The volume, Historical Statistics of Canada,26 shows that the population of 
Canada grew less than four fold between 1891 and 1959, and yet the number of 
convictions for indictable offences grew twenty fold in that period. One can see 
this clearly in New Brunswick. It is hard to believe that in 1892 there were only 
74 indictable offence convictions for persons 16 years of age and over for all of
23M-L. Friedland, The Trials of Israel Lipski: A True Story of a Victorian Murder in the East End of 
London (London: Macmillan, 1984) at 25.
^See M. Daly & M. Wilson, Homicide (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1988) at 169.
^M. Crawford and R. Gartner, Women Killing: Intimate Femicide in Ontario, 1974-1990 (Toronto: 
Women We Honour Action Committee, 1992) at 34.
26M.C. Urquhart & ICA.H. Buckley, Historical Statistics of Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965) at 634.
New Brunswick. The population of those 16 and over doubled by 1960, but the 
convictions for indictable offences increased from 74 to 1,350, again an almost 
twenty-fold increase.
As well, the police forces have kept growing. While I do not know the figure 
for the growth of police forces from 1892 to 1960,1 do know that between 1962 
and 1991 police forces in Canada grew from 26,000 officers to 56,000, or from one 
officer per 584 persons in 1962 to today’s figure of one officer per 356 persons.27 
Most of this growth has been in patrol policing.28 A key question is whether the 
growth in policing is because of the growth in crime or whether it is, at least in 
part, the other way around: the more police, the more crime that is found.
Much of the offence increase is for conduct that was not criminalized in 1892. 
As previously mentioned, there were no automobiles in 1892. Today, it has been 
estimated that perhaps 40% of court time is taken up with impaired driving 
cases.29 A recent British document estimated that road traffic offences occupy 
between 50 and 70% of Magistrates’ court time.30 It is unfortunate that the 
automobile came along at the very time that there was a shift in policing strategy 
from inspection and compliance to apprehension and the deterrence model of 
policing. If traffic safety regulation had originally been oriented towards 
compliance rather than deterrence, we might have concentrated on other 
techniques, such as licensing and rewards, rather than criminal prosecutions, just 
as we do not rely primarily on criminal prosecutions for the regulation of, for 
example, railways or the collection of income tax.31
Another growth industry that looms very large today, but was not in existence 
in 1892, is the control of narcotics. This crime was introduced by the Opium Act 
in 190832 It is not surprising that the growth in policing has resulted in the
^Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Police Personnel and Expenditures in Canada (Ottawa: 
Statistics Canada, 1992).
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^See K. Jobson and G. Ferguson, “Toward a Revised Sentencing Structure for Canada” (1987) 66 
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S.C. 1908, c. 50. See C.N. Mitchell, “Narcotics: A Case Study in Criminal Law Creation” in J. 
Gladstone et àl., eds, Criminology: A Reader’s Guide (Toronto: Centre of Criminology, 1991) at 177;
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growth of prosecutions for motor vehicle and narcotics offences. They occur in 
places which can be easily observed by patrol policing and, as previously 
mentioned, the growth of policing has been primarily in patrols.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada advocated restraint in the criminal 
justice system. Â surprisingly large proportion of the population today has been 
convicted of non-driving offences.33 Overuse of the criminal law makes the fear 
of a conviction a less potent force in society. We should certainly pay more than 
lip-service to the important concept of restraint.
The result of this increase in criminal charges has meant a major growth in the 
number of courtrooms, judges and prosecutors and a significant degree of over­
crowding and delay in the courts. It is not just the number of cases that have 
caused congestion, but the length of the individual trials. My book on Valentine 
Shortis, who was tried for murder in Quebec in 1895, makes the point that the 29 
day trial in that case was the longest murder trial ever held in Canada up till then, 
and was possibly the longest in the British Empire.34 Today, many preliminary 
hearings last longer than 29 days. We should continue to examine carefully 
techniques for cutting down the length of trials and eliminating undue delay. 
Eliminating the preliminary hearing, for example, but requiring full judicially 
supervised pre-trial disclosure, is a step worth careful consideration.
The Supreme Court of Canada has been vigorously giving substance to s. 11(b) 
of the Charter, which provides that a person charged with an offence has the right 
to be “tried within a reasonable time.” In the well-known Askov case,35 the 
Court not only held that the delay in that case was unreasonable, which it clearly 
was, but went on to say that “a period of delay in a range of some six to eight 
months between committal and trial might be deemed to be the outside limit of 
what is reasonable.”
As a result of Askov, between October 1990, and September 1991, over 47,000 
charges were stayed or withdrawn in Ontario alone. In the subsequent Supreme 
Court case of Morin36 the Court modified its approach, and upheld a delay of 
over 14 months in an impaired driving case. In all of these cases the Supreme 
Court37 has followed the American approach that “dismissal must remain ... the
33T. Gabor, Everybody Does It: Crime and the General Public (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
forthcoming).
34Valentine Shortis, supra, note 12 at 31-32.
35R. v. Askov (1990), 59 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.).
36See R. v. Morin (1992), 71 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Morin].
21Rahey v. The Queen (1987), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.).
only possible remedy.”38 I think Justice La Forest was right in his dissent that 
other remedies such as expediting the trial should also be available.39
Another reason for the congestion of the courts is the growth of legal aid 
throughout Canada. Ontario introduced its legal aid plan in 1967 and today this 
excellent system, allowing legally aided persons to select their own counsel, is 
costing the province of Ontario over 300 million dollars a year. One way of 
controlling costs is to introduce a public defender system as one of the accused’s 
options. This approach is being experimented with in Ontario today in certain 
non-criminal areas. I believe that it should be expanded to criminal cases. The 
accused could be given a choice between a public defender and his or her own 
choice of counsel. Given a choice, many accused persons would choose to have 
a public defender handle their cases.
A further growth industry since 1892 is the appeal of criminal cases. There 
were then relatively few criminal cases appealed because the 1892 Code required 
that appeals must either be “reserved” by the trial judge for the opinion of the 
Court of Appeal or have the consent of both the Attorney General and the Court 
of Appeal.40 So, it is not surprising that there were relatively few appeals 
reported in the volume of the Canadian Criminal Cases (C.C.C.) that dealt with 
cases decided in the 1890s.41 There were only two reserved criminal cases to the 
Supreme Court of New Brunswick reported in the C.C.C.s in these early years. 
It was not until 1923 that the 1892 Code was amended to provide for a general 
right of appeal from a conviction, without the leave of the trial judge.42 There 
were then no appeals by the Crown from an acquittal. Appeals from acquittals in 
indictable cases were not introduced in Canada until 1930.43
In contrast to the position in Canada, appeals by prosecutors from acquittals 
are generally not permitted in the United States or in England. In my opinion, we 
should be less willing to order a new trial following an acquittal. A new trial 
should only be ordered following an acquittal if the error was “on the whole case
^See Strunk v. U.S. (1973), 412 U.S. 343 at 440 (U.S.S.C.) Burger C.J.; Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 
U.S. 514 at 522 (U.S.S.C) Powell J.
39See M.L. Friedland, “Controlling the Administrators of Criminal Justice” (1989) 31 Crim. L. Q. 280 
at 304-07; MA. Code, Trial Within a Reasonable Time (Scarborough: Carswell, 1992).
40See M.L. Friedland, Double Jeopardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) at 229-30.
41(1898), 1 C.C.C. dealt with cases from 1895 to 1898.
42S.C. 1923, c. 41, s. 9.
43S.C. 1930, c. 11, s. 28; Double Jeopardy, supra, note 40 at 281.
a probable explanation of the verdict of the jury.”44 Such a test would cut down 
on the number of cases in which the Crown would choose to appeal an acquitted.
Mr. Masters could not fail to observe another significant change from his day, 
that is, the large numbers of visible minority and aboriginal persons caught up in 
the criminal justice system. The Manitoba Justice Inquiry in 1991 showed the 
extraordinary number of aboriginal persons in custody in Manitoba.45 In 1989, 
Aboriginal persons made up 56% of the population of all correctional institutions 
in Manitoba, federal and provincial. Yet, Aboriginal people make up less than 
12% of Manitoba’s population. Prior to the Second World War, the Inquiry found 
that the Aboriginal prison population was no greater than the Aboriginal 
representation in the population. I assume that this would also be the case in 
1892, leaving aside incarceration following the Riel rebellion in the North West.
The Marshall Inquiry in Nova Scotia had equally disturbing figures for Blacks 
and Aboriginals.46 Ontario has just set up an inquiry into race relations and the 
criminal justice system and no doubt they will find a similar pattern of over­
representation. We will all be carefully looking for the solutions that will emerge 
from the Ontario Inquiry.47 Just as in the 1960s and 70s society strove to make 
the accused’s poverty an irrelevancy, in the 1990s we should strive to make the 
accused’s race and ethnic origin irrelevant.
Let us return to the question of codification. No doubt, Mr. Masters would 
ask about plans for a new Criminal Code as we are about to enter the 21st 
century. The embarrassed reply would be something like this. The Law Reform 
Commission of Canada was established by Parliament in 1971.48 The then 
Minister of Justice, John Turner, stated in the House when the Bill was under 
consideration that “the Commission should have a complete re-writing of the 
criminal law as one of its first projects.”49 The so-called “young tigers” that were 
first appointed, and I must acknowledge that I was one of them for a time, 
contemplated, in their first Research Programme, a new Criminal Code containing 
both criminal law and procedure.50
^See Vallance v. The Queen (1961), 35 A.L.J.R. 182 at 185 (H. C. of Aust.) Dixon C.J.; supra, note 
41 at 303.
“^ Manitoba, Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People, Report of the 
Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, vols 1 & 2 (Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 1991).
46Royal Commission Report on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution (Halifax: The Commission, 1989).
47Order-in-Council dated 1 October 1992: Co-Chairs, D. Cole and M. Gittens.
^RS.C. 1970, c. 23, 1st Supp.
49House of Commons Debates (23 February 1970) at 3963.
^First Research Program of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, March 1972, at 14.
However, progress was slow in spite of an impressive number of excellent 
working papers and reports, and in 1979 the then Minister of Justice announced 
a “comprehensive and accelerated review” of the Criminal Code.51 It was to be 
a collaborative effort involving the Law Reform Commission, the Solicitor 
General’s Department, and the Department of Justice, with the Justice 
Department talcing the lead. However, the predicted time period for completion 
of the work kept expanding.
It was eventually hoped that the new Criminal Code would be completed by 
1992, the centenary of the present one, but this is obviously not now possible. So, 
what will happen? Currently, a Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on 
Justice and the Solicitor General are conducting hearings on the General Part of 
the code.52 There is still a great amount of basic work to be done on the three 
other parts: criminal procedure,53 the substantive offences,54 and corrections.55 
We wiU be fortunate to have a new code by the turn of the century.
I hope that the Parliamentary Sub-Committee issues a favourable report on 
the necessity for a new Criminal Code. A new code is certainly needed. For 
example, one of the major defects in the present one, is that the mental elements 
for each offence are rarely spelled out. James Fitzjames Stephen is to blame. He 
wanted to leave those issues to the judiciary. R.S. Wright’s code, on the other 
hand, would have defined the various terms used just as the modern American 
codes do. The American Law Institute’s four categories of purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness and negligence are sensible. One wonders why the Law Reform 
Commission wished to invent a different set of mental states, adopting only three 
categories and leaving out the important concept of “knowledge.56
It will be difficult to bring into force a general part deeding with mens rea until 
the substantive offences are re-drafted to incorporate the new categories. If this 
is not done, we can expect a great debate over the so-called default or residual 
rule, that is, what mental state should be required if nothing is stated. The Law 
Reform Commission of Canada wants the default rule to be the very high mental
51See the Tenth Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1980-81, at 13.
52See the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the 
General Part of the Criminal Code, May 12,1992 ff.
^See the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Recodifying Criminal Procedure (Report 33), vol. 1,
(1991) and Our Criminal Procedure (Report 32) (1988).
^Law Reform Commission of Canada, Recodifying Criminal Law (Report 31) (1988).
55See the Report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission (1987).
^Report 31, Recodifying Criminal Law at 21ff: see A. Kurke, “The Mental Element” in Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General Part of the 
Criminal Code, 15 June 1992.
state of “purpose.” In contrast, the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code 
adopted “recklessness” as the residual rule. I anticipate that this important 
question will loom much larger in the future them it has in the discussions thus far.
My suggestion, and I made this suggestion to the Parliamentary Sub- 
Committee,57 is that it is desirable to enact the Criminal Code in stages, but to 
consider implementing it as a whole only after other parts have been enacted. It 
is desirable because one wants to see the whole picture first. It is also desirable 
because if the whole is put forward for enactment at one time it is likely to fail. 
There are many controversial features of any Criminal Code, police powers, 
abortion, duty to rescue, gun control, and hate literature, to name only a few. 
Special interest groups will mount campaigns against the provisions that they 
dislike and it will be difficult to gain acceptance of the package as a whole. We 
saw this occur last October 26th in relation to the Charlottetown Accord.
Canada is not unique in its frustrating attempt to obtain a new code. England 
started producing a new Criminal Code in 1968 and it has still not been enacted.58 
The Federal Government of the United States started the process in 1966 and they 
still do not have a new one.59
So, my advice is to enact the code in stages, perhaps only implementing parts 
of it when the later stages have been enacted. As well, the very controversial 
issues should be left out and the present law on those issues accepted for the time 
being.
“Will not the new Law Reform Commission save the day,” our Mr. Masters 
would ask. Another embarrassed reply would inform Mr. Masters that this very 
important institution was abolished in late February, 1992. The federal Minister 
of Finance, not the Minister of Justice, announced in his budget speech that the 
Law Reform Commission of Canada, along with a number of other federal 
agencies, would be eliminated for financial reasons. I knew they were serious 
when, about a month later, a courier delivered my picture that had been hanging 
on the wall at the Commission in Ottawa. So, Masters would correctly observe, 
law reform is back in the hands of the Department of Justice, just as it was in his 
day.
Let us hope that this is a temporary situation and that the Government will 
find another vehicle, still somewhat removed from day-to-day politics, to monitor
^Minutes of Proceedings, ibid. at 2:14.
58See Law Commission, Report No. 15, Third Annual Report, 1967-68 (1968).
^See generally, R.L. Gainer, “Report to the Attorney General on Federal Criminal Law Reform”
(1989) 1 Crim. Law Forum 99.
and advise on criminal justice. Perhaps the Government should consider 
implementing the law reform recommendations of the 1969Report of the Canadian 
Committee on Corrections,60 the Ouimet Report, a first-class document. The 
Committee recommended that the Government set up a non-governmental 
committee or council, advisory to the executive branch of government, rather than 
to any one department. They envisaged a permanent secretariat, a  research 
budget, and interdisciplinary committees on continuing law reform, law 
enforcement and corrections. Perhaps it could also handle some of the tasks 
envisaged for the permanent sentencing commission, recommended in 1987 by the 
Canadian Sentencing Commission.61
The one, really significant change in criminal justice since 1892 is the 
enactment and interpretation of the Charter. I am not sure what Masters would 
think of the Charter. My guess is that he might echo Jeremy Bentham’s view that 
a Bill of Rights is “nonsense on stilts.”62 In any event, that would likely have 
been his view in 1892.
The Charter, enacted in 1982, he would be told, has had a very profound effect 
on the criminal law, much greater than most observers would have thought when 
it was enacted. In the first few years after its enactment, over 25% of the reported 
cases in the C.C.C.’s discussed the Charter.63 More recently, the number has 
risen to about 50%.64 The percentage is even higher among the reported 
Supreme Court of Canada cases.
The Supreme Court of Canada has been very active in using the rather vague 
words in the Charter to reform criminal law and procedure. Take s. 7, for 
example: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and 
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.” In the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act case,65 in my opinion the 
most important criminal law Charter case decided by the Supreme Court, the 
Court extended the meaning of “fundamental justice” to include substantive, not 
just procedural justice. They held that it is a denial of fundamental justice if a 
statute permits imprisonment for an absolute liability offence. Section 7 has since 
been used in a number of other significant cases: in Vaillancourt to strike down
“ (Ottawa, 1969) at 430-31.
61Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1987) at 437ff.
®J. Bentham, Anarchic Fallacies.
^See M.L. Friedland, “Criminal Justice and the Charter” in Friedland, ed., A Century of Criminal 
Justice (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) at 205.
^E-g., 280 out of 535 reported cases in volumes 51-62 of the Canadian Criminal Cases. I am indebted 
to Alan Baldachin, a student in the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, for compiling this figure.
65Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (1985), 23 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.).
the constructive murder sections,66 in Morgentaler to strike down the abortion 
legislation,67 in Hebert to give a right to silence,68 and in Stinchcombe to require 
pre-trial disclosure by the Crown.69
No doubt Mr. Masters would observe that the activism of the Supreme Court 
has a direct correlation with the failure of Parliament to act on the various 
recommendations of the Law Reform Commission. He would also note that Chief 
Justice Antonio Lamer was a former President of the Law Reform Commission 
of Canada and that Justice Gerald La Forest was a member. He would be 
forgiven for thinking that they would appear to be doing through the Court what 
they had trouble doing through the Commission.
One unfortunate effect of the Court’s activism is to take the impetus away 
from Parliament to amend the criminal law. This effect is unfortunate, because 
Parliament should be the primary actor in changing the law. Parliament can, in 
theory, look at the issue in the context of other contemplated changes, engage in 
greater consultation, and change the law again if it proves unsatisfactory. When 
the Court reforms the law through the Constitution,70 it cannot easily be changed 
by Parliament. The United States Supreme Court was forced to remake criminal 
law and procedure to achieve minimum standards applicable to the States. But 
in Canada, jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure is a federal, not a 
provincial matter, and so can be made uniform across Canada by Parliament.
A cooperative relationship between the Court and Parliament is needed. The 
Court should nudge and even threaten future action, not act as a substitute for 
Parliament. In some recent Supreme Court cases one can see more sensitivity to 
Parliament’s primary role. The Court has thrown the drafting of the law back to 
Parliament. In the Swain case,71 for example, the Supreme Court permitted the 
law concerning confinement of those found not guilty by reason of insanity to 
stand for six months until Parliament enacted new legislation.
“Has not the adoption of an American-style Charter brought Canada closer to 
American law,” Mr. Masters might question, adding that “counsel do not seem to 
quote English cases like they did in my day.” There is no question Masters is
66Vaillancourt v. The Queen (1987), 39 C.C.C. (3d) 118 (S.C.C.); R  v. Martineau (1990), 58 C.C.C. (3d) 
353 (S.C.C.); Sit v. The Queen (1991), 66 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.).
67Morgentaler et aL v. The Queen (1988), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.).
^ R  v. Hebert (1990), 57 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
69Stinchcombe v. The Queen (1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
70Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
nR  v. Swain (1991), 63 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.). See also R  v. Bain (1992), 69 C.C.C. (3d) 481 
(S.C.C.).
right. The Supreme Court, has more or less taken over the American law of 
search and seizure and the Miranda rule relating to the interrogation of 
suspects.72 Note the recent change of emphasis in most criminal law casebooks 
from English to American cases. Further, about 30% of the Supreme Court of 
Canada criminal cases now dte U.S. cases and in all courts, both civil and 
criminal, the percentage is increasing. Before the introduction of the Charter, less 
than 3% of all the cases in the Dominion Law Reports cited U.S. cases; now over 
10% do so.
My conclusion to this tour of criminal justice over the past century is that 
although there has been considerable growth in the criminal justice industry and 
many of the offences have changed, criminal justice today has remained much the 
same as it was a century ago. The Charter, Mr. Masters would correctly observe, 
has more or less locked us into existing procedures and will ensure that criminal 
justice, as we know it, will remain in much the same form for the next hundred 
years.
72See A.D. Gold and M. Fuerst, “The Stuff that Dreams are Made of! -  Criminal Law and the 
Charter of Rights” (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 13; Harvie and Foster, “Different Drummers, Different 
Drums: The Supreme Court of Canada, American Jurisprudence and the Continuing Revision of 
Criminal Law Under the Charter” (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 39.
